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INTRODUCTION
The decoding of the human genome, announced with great
fanfare by President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair in
June, 2000,' marked a hugely symbolic milestone in the progress of
genetic science. Mapping the roughly three billion nucleotide pairs
that comprise the human genetic profile is a monumental
achievement of human ingenuity and technological sophistication.2
Yet, before the knowledge unleashed by the Human Genome Project
can be widely used to improve human health and welfare, much work
remains to be done: Scientists must first locate, along the 23 paired
f' Charles A. Heimbold, Jr., Professor of Law and Economics, University of
Pennsyvania.
tt Professor of Law, Boston University. Professor Cohen wishes to thank the
member,, of the Yale Law and Technology Society who attended her presentation of
this raper in workshop format and who engaged its terms with spirited aplomb.
S,'r Colin Macilwain, World Leaders Heap Praise on Human Genome Landmark, 405
NTURE 983, 983 (2000) ("Clinton hosted an event at the White House ... joined by
video link from London by... Blair.").
Se'e Nicholas Wade, Genome Analysis Shows Humans Survive on Low Number of Genes,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 2001, at Al. The "genome" is defined as all of the genetic
material in the chromosomes of a particular organism. The 3.2 billion letters that
represent the chemical composition of the human genome would, if printed in
standard newspaper type, comprise 75,490 pages of "neus." Id. Computer programs
xastly increased the speed with which these letters could be separated into
approximate sequences so that the actual genes within the genome could be mapped.
Once the rough map was completed, it emerged-contrary to the consensus
prediction xwithin the scientific community-that humans make do with only about
30,000 genes-far less than the 100,000 or so that the map had been expected to yield.
Id. Thus it turns out that we humans have only a third more genes than, for example,
xorms. Id. This startling discovery has led one of the authors to reduce the
differences benveen humans, worms, and other creatures to the great (and optimistic!)
folk maxim: "It ain't what you got; it's what you do with what you got."
J So' Nicholas Wade, Now, the Hard Part: Putting the Genome to Work, N.Y. TIMES,
(1439)
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human chromosomes, the currently estimated 30,000 genes that do all
of the real work: that build and repair the body and regulate its
functions. Within that universe of genetic material, they must then
isolate those specific genetic variations-alleles,3  mutations, or
polymorphisms-that are associated with particular, adverse physical
or psychological conditions, such as diseases, functional impairments,
and perhaps even socially maladaptive behaviors. Epidemiologists
must then study the statistical link between the presence of a
particular genetic profile and the manifestation of a particular
condition, while proteomics specialists explore the biochemical
pathways by which the proteins produced by particular genetic
mutations inhibit or otherwise modify normal bodily functioning."
Yet, daunting as the challenge may prove to be, progress is being
made at almost breathtaking speed. Every week, breakthroughs are
announced in the search for genes, the cataloging of alleles, the
identification of their functions, and the estimation of risk factors.
Perhaps the most dramatic payoff from this unfolding progress is the
development of genetic tests for predisposition to various diseases and
functional impairments. Tests already have been developed to
identify the presence of over four hundred particular alleles or
June 27, 2000, at F1 ("Scientists have nearly finished sequencing the entire human
genome, but putting all the bits of DNA in order is only the first phase in the effort to
compile a complete operating manual of the human machine.").
The "decoding" of the genome belies the difficulty of understanding what
specific functions each gene actually serves; how genes coordinate their functions;
whether most of the nucleotides that comprise inactive genes are useless "junk" or
perform useful work; how and why some genes fail to reproduce in normal ways; how
abnormal genetic variations behave so as to contribute toward processes of illness and
disease; how and why genes die; and how their deaths affect the death of the entire
being. See Rick Weiss, Life's Blueprint in Less Than an Inch; Research: Little of Genome
Makes a Human, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2001, at Al.
For a clear, accessible description of the "work" that genes do in relation to other
biological and environmental causes of human development, see Elliott Sober, The
Meaning of Genetic Causation, Appendix One to ALLEN BucHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE
TO CHOICE: GENETICS ANDJUSTICE 347 (Allen Buchanan et al. eds., 2000).
5Alleles occupy specific loci on a given chromosome, but do so in pairs, one
inherited from each parent. See THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES
IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 375 (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., 1992)
(providing a glossary definition of "allele"). Each member of such a pair may take one
of a number of different forms.
6 Carol Ezzell, Beyond the Human Genome, SCI. AM., July 2000, at 64, 67-69
(describing the techniques involved in proteomics, the study of protein expression).
The range of genetic adaptations that can be said to describe the "normal" promises to
yield either a more rigorous understanding of the functions that will justifT the
concept or a rejection of "the normal" as any kind of paradigmatic baseline view.
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polymorphisms that are linked to diseases such as Huntington's
Disease, cystic fibrosis, sickle-cell trait, Duchenne's muscular
dystrophy, and breast and colon cancer.7 At present, genetic testing is
used primarily to diagnose adverse health conditions currently
experienced by symptomatic patients or to predict the onset of
conditions in persons identified by their family histories to be at risk
of genetic disease. ' But, as the range and accuracy of genetic tests
increase and the cost of their administration falls, one can foresee a
day when anyone may readily and inexpensively obtain a genetic
profile that can identify, or rule out, any of thousands of conditions
for which he or she may be at elevated risk.
The prospect of widespread genetic testing has stirred in the
popular imagination optimism and anxiety in roughly equal measures.
The basis for the optimism is obvious. Accurate, comprehensive, and
inexpensive genetic testing, coupled with reliable epidemiological
evidence of the probability of expression, promises dramatic
improvement in the early detection and prevention of disease. Such
knowledge should enable an individual to take preventive steps such
as medication, medical monitoring, prophylactic surgery, or
behavioral and environmental modifications that may be wholly or
partially effective at staving off or even eliminating the onset of
disease. Knowledge of this sort can also help people to make
discerning educational and career decisions, investment and wealth-
transmission plans, work and insurance-related risk assessments, and
reproductive choices."
The scientific breakthroughs that make genetic testing possible
also promise to spawn dramatic improvements in the treatment of
disease, ranging from improved use of the existing pharmacopoeia, to
Rick Weiss, Ignorance Undercuts Gene Tests'PotentiaL WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2000, at
Al. Al.~e~y eralyRAYIMOSELEY ET AL., THE ETHICAL, LEGA AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS
OF PREDICTIVE GENETIC TESTING FOR HEALTH, LIFE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE:
POLIC ' ANALy 515 AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1995).The coupling of prenatal genetic testing as a matter of popular availability with a
legal regime that allows for the rights to plan, space, limit, and abjure pregnancy has
stirred concern over the potential for large increases in the use of abortion. The
motihation for this development is claimed to stem from two highly divergent
sources-priate efforts to avoid the rearing of significantly health-impaired children
and speculation about government efforts to discourage such births on grounds of
public cost containment. See, e.g., David T. Morris, Cost Containment and Reproductive
Autonomy: Prenatal Genetic Screening and the American Health Security Act of 1993, 20 Am.
J.L. & MED. 295 (1994) (arguing for prenatal genetic screening service as part of a
basic national health plan).
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the creation of new pharmaceuticals targeted to persons with
particular genetic profiles, to a range of gene therapy interventions
designed to neutralize "bad" genes."'  What is more, the
epidemiological findings made possible by the new genetics can aid in
the creation of improved environmental, engineering, and behavioral
strategies for preventing disease and other functional impairments.
At the same time, the prospect of genetic screening has
engendered widespread popular apprehension. One source of this
apprehension may be the fear, attributed to some particularly risk-
averse individuals, that the new genetics will somehow force upon
them unwanted self-awareness. Persons exhibiting this psychological
aversion, sometimes called the "nocebo" effect," prefer to remain in a
state of medical or genetic ignorance for fear that knowledge will
reveal the presence of a predisposition for a condition that is
incurable or preventable only by resort to costly and difficult
12measures.
10 For a description of the potential medical applications of the new genetic
technologies, see the essays collected in BIOTECHNOLOGY SCIENCE, ENGINEERING,
AND ETHICAL CHALLENGES FOR THE TWENTy-FIRST CENTURY (Frederick B. Rudolph &
Larr1 V. McIntire eds., 1996).
Troy Duster, The Social Consequences of Genetic Disclosure, in BEIVLIORIL
GENETICS: THE CLASH OF CULTURE AND BIOLOGY 172, 185-86 (Ronald A. Carson &
Mark A. Rothstein eds., 1999).
W2 hile certainly plausible, the notion that there is a subpopulation of individuals
with a stable preference not to know about their genetic predispositions is an empirical
construct with little grounded support. The little factual support offered form this
proposition relies on small groups of persons at risk of developing Huntington's
Disease, a horrific, late-onset neurological wasting disease that is inevitably fatal and
presently incurable. See, e.g., Paul R. Billings et al., Discrimination as a Consequence of
Genetic Testing, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 476, 481 (1992) (citing the refusals of
individuals to participate in two studies related to the risk of Huntington's Disease).
But see Sandi Wiggins et al., The Psychological Consequences of Predictive Testing for
Huntington's Diseas 327 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1401 (1992) (reporting that a study sample
of individuals at risk for Huntington's Disease suggested that predictive testing
provides psychological benefits for those whose test results demonstrate either
increased or decreased risk relative to the baseline). For the earliest report of research
that made testing for Huntington's Disease possible, see James F. Gusella et al., A
Polymorphic DNA Marker Genetically Linked to Huntington's Disease, 306 NATURE 234
(1983).
As more diseases become subject to amelioration and cure, it may become
increasingly difficult to predict categorical risk-aversion toward the acquisition of
knowledge, at least on the part of individuals with reasonable access to successful
modalities for treatment. Because of their small sampling size and the extraordinary
severity of the disease, the Canadian researchers who reported in The New England
Journal Wiggins et al., supra, cautioned in their findings against attempts to generalize
from their data, a caution the Billings study, despite its modest sample size, does not
contain.
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A far more common basis for apprehension stems from a fear that
information about one's genetic profile, will be disclosed to others
without one's consent and will then be used to one's personal
disadvantage.' For example, family or friends or co-workers might, as
a consequence of knowing about a person's genetic profile, pity or
fear or shun him. A prospective marriage partner might break off a
relationship. An adoption agency might refuse an application to
adopt a child. A divorce court might decline to award custody of a
child to a parent considered genetically impaired. A jury or an
insurance company might award less compensation to a disabled tort
Victim whose genetic profile indicated a shorter-than-normal life
expectancy. A mortgage lender might decline an application for a
loan. An employer might decline to hire a job applicant because of
"defective" genes, reassign her to less satisfying work, or subject her to
special supervision and monitoring.
The fear of genetic testing's dark side has generated a flood of
proposals for the legal protection of genetic privacy, 14 which has, in
turn, produced a growing torrent of legislative and administrative
enactments at the state and federal levels of government.1, Although
ji For a suggestive list of contexts in which a third party might seek access to
intormation about a person's genetic profile, see Richard S. Fedder, To Know or Not To
Kw w: Legal Perspectives on Genetic Privacy and Disclosure of an Individual's Genetic Profile,
21J. LEGAL MED. 557,567 (2000).
11 For a sample from the Vast literature, see Lori B. Andrews & Ami S. Jaeger,
(onfidentiality of Genetic Information in the Workplace, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 75 (1991);
George J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded 'Future Diaries,' 270
JAMA 2346 (1993); GeorgeJ. Annas et al., Drafting the Genetic Privacy Act: Science, Poliy,
and Practical Considerations, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 360 (1995); Lawrence 0. Gostin,
Gencti Privacy, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 320 (1995); Kathy L. Hudson et al., Genetic
Discrimination and Health Insurance: An Urgent Need for Reform, 270 SCIENCE 391 (1995).
One of the earliest advocates for genetic privacy protection was James Watson,
who, with Francis Crick, discovered the structure of DNA. See Stephen S. Hall, James
Watwm and the Search for Biolog's "Holy Grail, "SMITHSONIAN G., Feb. 1990, at 40. By
the late 1980s, many research geneticists supported proposals to deny access to genetic
screening results without each subject's prior consent. SeeJohn C. Fletcher, Where in
the World An, We Going with the New Genetics?, 5 J. CON TEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 33, 40
(1989) ("There was Very strong consensus that third parties, such as employers and
insure%, should not have access to the results of screening without the patient's
consent.").
I- See generally Philip R Reilly, Laws To Regulate the Use of Genetic Information, in
GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA
369 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) (surveying current state legislation, federal bills, and
model legislation); Karen H. Rothenberg, Genetic Information and Health Insurance: State
Lfgislative Approaches, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 312 (1995) (evaluating state legislative
strategies to address concerns regarding genetic discrimination in the health insurance
context); Karen Rothenberg et al., Genetic Information and the Workplace: Legislative
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the scope and content of these proposals and enacted measures vary
widely, they tend to employ two principal regulatory instruments to
protect against feared abuses of genetic information: restrictions on
disclosure and restrictions on use. Disclosure restrictions typically
forbid the communication or release of genetic information about an
identifiable individual to a third person without the individual's prior
informed consent. These measures often include ancillary
requirements concerning the handling, segregation, updating, or the
destruction of genetic information, the counseling of research
subjects prior to genetic testing, methods for securing substituted
consent for persons unable to give informed consent, and the like.
Use restrictions, by contrast, focus on the uses to which genetic
information may be put. By far the most common form of use
restriction is a prohibition on so-called "genetic discrimination."'
The antidiscrimination norm seeks to prevent persons from using
information about a subject's genetic profile as a basis for withholding
certain privileges or benefits or granting such benefits only on
conditions less favorable than would otherwise be imposed.
Of the many contexts in which genetic discrimination has been or
might be practiced, the two that have received the most attention and
have generated the most urgent calls for regulation are the markets
for insurance and employment. The insurance restrictions typically
forbid health insurers, and in some cases life or disability insurers,
from asking applicants for certain kinds of genetic information or
from using that information either to deny or curtail coverage or to
assign the applicant to an elevated risk classification." The
employment provisions typically restrict the kinds of genetic
information that employers may obtain from job applicants and
prohibit employers from using such information as a basis for various
kinds of actions, such as refusal to hire, refusal to promote, relegation
Approaches and Policy Challenges, 275 SCIENCE 1755, 1756 (1997) (urging policyrnakers
to consider the risk that the use of genetic information could result in employment
discrimination and a lack of privacy in the workplace).
16 For a review of the history of the term "genetic discrimination," see Philip R.
Reilly, Genetic Discrimination, in GENETIC TESTING AND THE USE OF INFORMATION 106,
107 (Clarisa Long ed., 1999).
17 Rothenberg, supra note 15, at 313-17. For reasons reflective of the apparent
public perception that health insurance is crucial to personal well-being, whereas life
and disability insurance coverage is less so, regulatory restrictions on insurance
discrimination have not tended to be uniform acio ; it,.- ( ,,egories. For a British
reflection of concern that takes this same uneven 1on, see Onora O'Neill, Insurance
and Genetics: The Current State of Play, 61 MOD. L. REv. 716 (1998). See aloASS'N OF
BRITISH INSURERS, POLICYSTATEMENT ON LIFE INSURANCE AND GENETICS (1997).
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to unfavorable work assignments, or discharge. 8
The nondisclosure and nondiscrimination strategies are closely
interrelated. One of the primary purposes of protecting a person
against the disclosure of genetic information is to limit the danger that
it will be used to his or her disadvantage in interpersonal relationships
or market transactions. One obviously cannot base discrimination on
a person's genetic profile unless one has first obtained information
about that profile. Nonetheless, we see the two strategies as
analytically and morally distinct. The nondisclosure norm is, we
believe, both practically enforceable and morally attractive. It
recognizes the fundamental moral value of human autonomy, on the
basis of which almost any plausible version of liberal ethics must be
founded.' Whether one's primary moral desideratum is individual
liberty, human equality, or social welfare, one can comfortably
conclude that an individual should have a prima facie right to control
the dissemination of information about her body, just as she has a
prima facie right to oppose unauthorized invasions of her physical
integrity. Thus, the law may reasonably forbid third parties from
appropriating such information without obtaining an individual's
prior informed consent.
A similarly blunt-cut judgment that the nondiscrimination norm
should hold sway over regulatory decisions involving the use of
genetic information within the markets for employment and
insurance is, by contrast, far more problematic. In our view, the
attempt to prohibit genetic discrimination tout simple is misguided. In
this essay, we offer two primary reasons for this view. First, as we argue
in Part I, the strategy faces enormous practical difficulties of
implementation and enforcement, and is, therefore, almost surely
doomed to produce either failure or a massive disappointment of
expectations. Second, as we go on to describe in Part II, the strategy
is, however well-intentioned, morally unjustified. Here, we make two
claims: To begin with, the effort to ban genetic discrimination within
insurance and employment markets would, if successful, cause
significant welfare losses due to the distortion of allocative efficiency.
Paul Steven Miller, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
189, 193 (1998) (citing state statutes addressing the issue of genetic discrimination in
the employment context); Rothenberg et al., supra note 15, at 1755-56 (discussing New
Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin statutes).
For an account of the multiple meanings of, and values protected by, genetic
privacy, see Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC
SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31 (Mark A.
Rothstein ed., 1997).
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Next, the strategy cannot be justified as an appropriate means of
achieving the goal that it is most commonly advanced to promote,
namely, equality of opportunity. Instead, by selectively favoring a
single type of moral "bad luck," while concealing both the extent and
the form of its intended cross-subsidies, such a broad-based-that is to
say, indiscriminate-use of the nondiscrimination principle may well
achieve the opposite result.
I. PRACTICAL RESERVATIONS
A. The Emerging Genetic Privacy Regime
After an early burst of enthusiasm, popular attitudes toward the
unfolding genetic revolution have grown steadily more apprehensive
in recent years." One can trace this shift in public opinion to at least
four interlinked phenomena. First, as the recast artifact of an earlier
era's troubled history, the specter of a "new eugenics" began to21
emerge. The very term "eugenics" invokes a sense of collective guilt
for our own history of racist and genetic perfectionism, as well as
revulsion at the atrocities committed in the name of Nazi ideology
and more recent instances of "ethnic cleansing." In contemporary
dress, "new eugenics" conjures up a fear that genetic technologies will
be used not so much by governments as by a privileged class of private
20 The transformation of public attitudes is reflected in a series of widely cited
public opinion polls. See, e.g., ALAN WESTIN, REPORT ON NATIONAL OPINION SURVEYS
RELATING TO GENETIC TESTING, SCREENING AND USES OF GENETIC INFORMATION WITH
IMPLICATIONS FOR A NATIONAL SURVEY FOCUSED ON PRIVACY ISSUES AND SAFEGUARDS 1-
22 (1997) (discussing a 1986 Harris Organization poll, finding that sixty-six percent of
respondents considered genetic engineering a way to improve their lives; a 1992
National Opinion Research Center poll, finding that interviewees, by strong margins,
opposed the use of genetic information in hiring, even when directly relevant to
employee health; and a 1992 Harris Organization poll, reporting that nearly four out
of ten interviewees supported a ban on genetic testing until privacy issues have been
resolved); Andrew Sullivan, Promotion of the Fittest, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, § 6
(Magazine), at 16 (describing a 1998 survey in which sixty-three percent of
respondents opposed genetic testing if an employer or health insurer could hale
access to the results). The popular media have fanned the embers of public anxiety
with a series of alarmist stories about misuse of genetic information. See, e.g., Geoffrey
Cowley, lunk the Gene Test and Lose Your Insurance, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1996, at 48-50.
21 See, e.g., RUTH HUBBARD & ELIJAH WALD, EXPLODING THE GENE MYrH: HOW
GENETIC INFORMATION IS PRODUCED AND MANIPULATED BY SCIENTISTS, PHISICIANS,
EMPLOYERS, INSURANCE COMPANIES, EDUCATORS, AND LAW ENFORCERS 13-22 (1993);
DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENIcs: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN
HEREDITY (1985); Robert N. Proctor, Genomics and Eugenics: How Fair Is the Comparivon?
in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 57 (GeorgeJ. Annas & Sherman
Elias, eds. 1997).
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actors, to engineer a superior race of "perfect" people. '22
This process of selective genetic enhancement will, it is feared,
produce a permanent underclass of the genetically disadvantaged.
Feeding this concern is a growing store of largely unverified anecdotes
now in circulation about individuals who have been denied insurance,
or, more rarely, jobs, loans, or adoptive children, on account of their
perceived genetic vulnerabilities. These allegations have reverberated
through the popular media,2 where they inevitably float free of
whatever critical commentary might have attached to the research that
generated them.2'
Second, a growing chorus of critics have sounded an alarm against
both the risks and the sheer hubris of attempting to transform the
natural order through genetic manipulation. Grounded sometimes in
naturalist philosophy, sometimes in theological dogma, this sentiment
is fiequently captured in metaphor, such as the association of modern
genetic science with the Frankenstein legende' or its characterization
as an exercise in "playing God."2 This theme of genetic engineering
gone wrong has baited the imagination of generations of novelists
See, e.g., GLENN E. MCGEE, THE PERFECT BABY 111 (1997) ("Many critics of
genetic research make reference to a slippery slope that begins with curing illnesses
and ends in genetic modifications of appearance, intelligence and character.").
.See, e.g., Cowley, supra note 20, at 48 (reporting that one insurance company
cancelled coverage after discovering a genetic condition); Rachel Nowak, Genetic
Testing Set for Takeoff 265 SCIENCE 464, 466 (1994) (reporting that people with the
Huntington mutation are often denied insurance).
-1 The most heavily cited empirical study of alleged employment and insurance
discrimination is Billings et al., supra note 12. For a thoughtful criticism of the Billings
study, and other similar empirical studies, see Reilly, supra note 16, at 108-17 (arguing
that the Billings stud), produced very little evidence of actual discrimination based on
genetics). As Dr. Reilly's review makes clear, there have been very few empirical
studies, to date, of discriminatory conduct by health insurers and employers. Further,
the studies that have been undertaken thus far employ idely disparate definitions of
discrimination. Even under the most expansive definition, scant evidence of
discrimination based on genetic testing has been found. See, e.g., E. Virginia Lapham
et al., neticDiscrimination: Perspectives of Consumers, 274 SCIENCE 621 (1996).
The unimpressive empirical demonstrations of discrimination that these studies
represent may relate to the data-gathering methods employed and the lack of genetic
tests for most diseases. See Ellen Wright Clayton, Comments on Philip R. Reilly's "Genetic
Discrimination," in GENETIC TESTING AND THE USE OF INFORMATION 134, 135 (Clarisa
Long ed., 1999).
The association is carried forward in the disparaging label, "Frankenfoods,"
used by critics of genetically modified foods. See, e.g., Margot Roosevelt, Taking It to
Main Street, TIME,July 31, 2000, at 42.
See, e.g., JXNE GOODFIELD, PLAING GOD: GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE
MANIPULATION OF LIFE (1977); TED PETERS, PLAYING GOD? GENETIC DETERMINISM
AND HULxAN FREEDOM (1997);JEREM\ RIFKIN, WHO SHOULD PLAY GOD? (1977).
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27and, more recently, screenwriters.
A third contributor to anxieties about the genetic age derives
from exaggerated claims of DNA's role in shaping human identity and
experience. In their zeal to stir up popular support for their views,
biotechnology's boosters and critics alike feed an unfortunate
tendency toward genetic essentialism and determinism. Metaphorical
descriptors, such as genetic "future diaries,""5 evoke deep-seated fears
that the chemical letters that code for our chromosomes spell out a
fate for us that we do not choose and that, short of genetic
intervention, we cannot avoid.
Finally, concerns about the preservation of genetic confidentiality
have been subsumed within larger anxieties about our loss of control
over personal information-particularly medical records-in the
digital era. Like our credit, purchasing, educational, legal, and
employment histories, our medical histories and diagnostic data are
increasingly being reduced to electronic bits that are recorded,
packaged, manipulated, transmitted, and even sold.2" For many
Americans, these medical data banks have come to symbolize the ways
in which modern technology strips us of our privacy and commodifies
our identities.
The power of these genophobic qualms is undeniable: they tap
into deep wellsprings of moral intuition and personal vulnerability.
The authenticity of these qualms cannot be questioned; but their
expression and translation through the public policymaking process
can, and must, be questioned. Responding to the emotional force of
27 The modem literature traces from the two classics in the field: MARY SHELLEY,
FRANKENSTEIN (1818) and ALDOUS HuxLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932). The film
industry's recent contributions to fears about the genetic revolution include JURSsiC
PARK (Universal 1993), GATrACA (Columbia Pictures 1997), and THE 6TH DAY
(Columbia Pictures 2000).
28 Annas, supra note 14.
See A.M. Capron, Genetics and Insurance: Accessing and Using Private Information,
17 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 235, 253-54 (2000) (describing the operation of the insurance
industry's Medical Information Bureau); Gostin, supra note 14, at 320-22 (highlighting
several conceptual and technological innovations that are likely to accelerate the
"automation" of health records, including genetic testing, screening information, and
databases); see also Gina Kolata, When Patients' Records Are Commodities for Sale, N.Y
TImES, Nov. 15, 1995, at BI ("[P]rivate information is being bought and sold freely by
companies that have ignored a patchwork of varying state laws that should have made
it difficult to transfer those records across state lines."); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeff
Gerth, High-Tech Stealth Being Used To Sway Doctor Prescriptions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2000, at Al (discussing the purchasing of "prescriber profiles" of doctors by
pharmaceutical marketers in an effort "by drug makers to sway doctors' prescribing
habits").
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these anxieties, state and federal policymakers have, over the past two
decades, enacted into law a tangle of regulatory measures that are all
too often inconsistent, poorly coordinated, and ill-conceived.
The state governments have led the way in erecting this jerry-built
regulatory structure. Beginning with modest interventions designed
to bar the discriminatory use by health insurers of information about
specific genetic conditions linked to race, such as sickle-cell trait, state
legislatures gradually expanded the range and scope of these
prohibitions. "" By the beginning of the current decade, all states had
adopted legislation designed to provide some protection against the
unauthorized disclosure of "genetic" information and to prohibit the
use of such information in the underwriting of at least some kinds of
insurance. A minority of states had extended these restrictions to the
use of genetic information in the making of certain kinds of
employment decisions as well. The coverage of these enactments
varied widely in terms of the kinds of so-called "genetic" information
protected and the contexts in which its use was either prohibited,
permitted, or even mandated.
The federal government has also addressed the issue of genetic
discrimination, albeit somewhat more recently and more obliquely.3'
The federal regulatory intervention that deals most explicitly with
genetic discrimination in insurance 32 is the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") .1 The Act
restricts the extent to which employment-based group health
insurance plans can exclude coverage for "pre-existing conditions,"
defined to include genetic predispositions.m There are, however,
For a summary of these developments, see sources cited supra note 15.
Bills to prohibit genetic discrimination have been introduced in most recent
session, of Congress. See, e.g., Genetic Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance and
Employnent Act of 1999, S. 1322, 106th Cong. (1999); Genetic Nondiscrimination in
Health Insurance and Employment Act of 1999, H.R 2457, 106th Cong. (1999). To
date, however, Congress has not enacted legislation that addresses the issue squarely.
'2 The McCarran Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1014 (1994), reserves to the
states the primary role in regulating the business of insurance. To date, the federal
goxernment has intervened in the health insurance market primarily in its role as
regulator of employee benefit plans offered by employers in or affecting interstate
commerce and in its role as taxing authority, since such plans are tax-preferred.I Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996), codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181-1183 (Supp. 11 1996); 42
U.S.C. §§ 300gg-300gg-2 (Supp. 111996).
4 S,'e 29 U.S.C. § 1181(b) (1) (B) (Supp. 11 1996); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(b) (1) (B)
(Supp. 111996).
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several conspicuous gaps in the scope of HIPAA's protections, and
since the Act applies only to employment-based group health
insurance, its provisions do not reach the roughly one-third of
American workers unprotected by such plans nor, of course, the
unemployed.
The closest approximation to a federal prohibition against genetic
discrimination in employment resides within a questionable
administrative interpretation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1988 ("ADA").36 By its terms, the ADA affords protection only to
persons with a manifested "disability."37  The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") issued a guideline in 1995
interpreting the ADA to apply to pre-symptomatic individuals with a
genetic predisposition for a disabling condition This
interpretation-which on its face seems dubious3'-is not binding on
the judiciary and has yet to be tested in court.40 Even to the extent
that the ADA might be held to apply to genetic conditions, moreover,
it hedges the protections it affords in two crucial respects. First, the
Act requires employers to make only "reasonable accommodations" to
enable disabled persons to perform a job that they would otherwise
not be equipped to perform.4' Second, employers may, at the "pre-
placement" stage of hiring (after a conditional offer of employment
has been made), obtain and use information about an employee's
See Clayton, supra note 24, at 135-36.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
37 The Act defines "disability" as: (A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more life activities...; (B) a record of such an impairment;
or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see alwo id.
§ 12112(a), (d).
38 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 902:0045 (Mar. 1995).
39 Compare Mark S. Dichter & Sarah E. Sutor, The New Genetic Age: Do Our Genes
Make Us Disabled Individuals Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 42 VILL. L. REv.
613 (1997) (arguing that courts should not accept the guideline's interpretation of
asymptomatic coverage), with Frances H. Miller & Philip A. Huvos, Genetic Bluepnnts,
Employer Cost-Cutting and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 369
(1994) (arguing in favor of the guideline's construction).
40 It appears likely that the guideline, if and when it is tested in court, will receive
a chilly reception. In one of a trilogy of 1999 decisions narrowing the scope of the
ADA, the Supreme Court expressed doubt that any administrative agency, the EEOC
included, has authority to issue rules interpreting the general provisions of the ADA,
including the definition of "disability." Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
479 (1999). The other decisions in the trilogy are Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,
527 U.S. 516 (1999), and Alberison's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
41 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5).
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medical condition and history. Building on the EEOC guideline,
President Clinton issued an Executive Order in 2000 prohibiting
genetic discrimination in federal employment. 3 Like the ADA, the
Order contains several exceptions, including the use of genetic
information at the pre-placement stage." Significantly, moreover, it
permits employees considerable latitude with respect to information
the)' uish to voluntarily disclose.*
A survey of the emerging regulatory regime even as cursory as the
foregoing should begin to reveal its numerous short-comings and
compromises. These short-comings illustrate the difficulties of
erecting a coherent and workable system of protection against
"genetic discrimination." First, there is the problem of defining what
conditions are embraced within the term "genetic."' 6  Genetic
conditions can range from certain well-established, clinically defined
"diseases," to a wide variety of syndromes and functional incapacities,
as well as compulsive, addictive, or even patterned behaviors. 7
Indeed, since much of the story of how genes actually function
remains to be discovered, even this extensive catalog may ultimately
prove both narrow and unrefined. Do prohibitions on the use of
genetic information include restrictions on references to such
characteristics as intelligence, or aggressiveness, or obesity that appear
to have genetic, as well as environmental, roots?
Any attempt to single out inherited conditions for special
treatment immediately encounters the objection that most forms of
human misfortune have mixed environmental and genetic pedigrees.
Should society provide greater legal protection to a person whose
elevated risk of, say, colon cancer happens to be traceable to the
presence of a rare genetic mutation and not provide protection to
Id. § 12112 (d) (3).
Exec. Order No. 13,145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 8, 2000).
The Order permits federal employers to consider genetic information "to assess
whether further medical evaluation is needed to diagnose a current disease, or medical
condition or disorder." Id. § 1-301 (a) (2), at 6879.
I- The Order permits federal employees to authorize their employers to use
genetic intormation obtained in connection ith genetic or health care services
prvided by the employing agency. See id. § 1-301 (b) (2), at 6877.
On the difficulty of defining "genetic" for purposes of the genetic prixacy laws,
see Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Privacy and Confidentiality: Why They Are So Hard To
Piot,'rt, 26J.L. MED. & ETHICS 198 (1998); Michael S. Yesley, Protecting Genetic Difference,
13 BERUELEYTECH. LJ. 653 (1998).
;7 On the genetic roots of behavior and functional capacities such as intelligence,
see DE\N H VMER & PETER COPELkND, LIVING WTrH OUR GENES (1998); MrAT" RIDLEY,
GENME: THE AUTOBIOG X1HY OF A SPECIES IN 23 CHAPTERS (1999).
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another whose elevated risk is traceable to environmental exposure?
Furthermore, schemes such as the ADA, HIPAA, and the Clinton
Executive Order that permit adverse treatment of symptomatic
individuals, but prohibit adverse treatment of asymptomatic
individuals, need stronger explanation. Should we not provide
greater solicitude, indexed as some form of regulatory protection,
toward those with manifested conditions? Measures such as the ADA
that utilize the concept of "disability" to define the reach of their
jurisdiction have the advantage of focusing attention on the nature,
rather than the cause of a person's functional limitations. But the
"disability" category, for all its elasticity, is still far too limited to
embrace what may be unfair about the constraints that bad luck-
genetic or otherwise-can impose on a person.
A second difficulty involves defining the sources of legally
protected "genetic information." Most existing state statutes protect
only information derived from the testing of a person's genetic
material (DNA, RNA, chromosomes, ribosomes, or proteins). The
obvious defect of this approach is that "genetic" information may be
obtained from many other sources. Indeed, the kind of information
revealed by modem genetic testing differs only as a matter of degree
from forms of information that have been readily available for a very
long time.4 One can ascertain a great deal about a person's genetic
inheritance from direct physical observation, medical examinations
and tests, a personal medical history, a family medical history, and the
like. 9 Can we justify prohibiting the use of information obtained
from one source (genetic tests), but not others? Can we effectively
segregate information obtained through the use of prohibited sources
from information contained within permitted sources so as to enforce
4; See Soren Holm, There Is Nothing Special About Genetic Information, in GENETIC
INFORPMIATION: AcQUISITION, ACCESS, AND CONTROL 97 (Alison K. Thompson & Ruth
F. Chadwick eds., 1999); Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and "Future Diaries:
Is Genetic Information Different from Other Medical Information , in GENETIC SECRETS:
PROTECTING PRIVACV AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 60 (Mark A.
Rothstein ed., 1997) (asserting that, while we treat genetic information as "mysterious,"
it does not differ in any significant way from other sorts of information).
49 Professor Henry Greely, the author of this volume's Counterpoint, shrewdly
offers up the possibility that genetic information will be able to be backwardly inferred
from many standard medical diagnoses, thus leading to a conundrum concerning their
availability to employers and insurers. See Henry T. Greely, Genotype Discrimination: The
Complex Casefor Some Legislative Protection, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1497 (2001).
Others have observed that since many diseases, conditions, and predispositions are
traceable within families, solicitation of family histories may prove the most vulnerable
point of entry for market actors who wish to discriminate on genetic grounds.
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an, such prohibition?
Then, there is the ticklish problem of distinguishing between
adverse and favorable genetic information. Should a prohibition on
the use of genetic information apply only to uses that disadvantage the
subject? What if a person, perhaps previously thought to be at risk of
a genetic disease, discovers, thanks to a genetic test, that she is not?
Can an insurer use that information to place her in a more favorable
risk classification? Should a key individual in a corporate hierarchy
not be able to provide this kind of reassurance when she is being
considered for a move to the top? Virtually all of the extant
regulatory measures speak only to the issue of using genetic
information to discriminate against individuals. They are silent about
the use of genetic information to discriminate infavor of an individual.
Indeed, a few measures affirmatively permit individuals to volunteer
favorable genetic information. What, then, is to prevent insurers or
employers from inferring that a failure to volunteer favorable
information represents the existence of genetic bad news?
Furthermore, it is not always clear whether a bit of information is
favorable or unfavorable. What about genetic conditions that elevate
a person's probability of both adverse and beneficial outcomes, such
as a gene that both increases the risk of contracting a particular
disease and increases immunity to another disease? 5) Architects of the
legal regime face a dilemma. They may attempt the morally and
politically dubious feat of prohibiting the use of all genetic
information or they must attempt the administratively challenging feat
of segregating genetic information into a prohibited negative category
and a permitted positive category-categories that, for the foreseeable
future, would need to be updated constantly.
Finally, there is the problem of distinguishing prohibited uses of
genetic information from permitted, or even compulsory uses.
Regulatory prohibitions on the disclosure of genetic test results
without the tested individual's consent contain a variety of exceptions,
from public health protocols, to criminal prosecutions, to paternity
proceedings, to tort suits. The likelihood that such exceptions will
expand seems beyond cavil, whether for purposes that are similarly
public in nature or for private or quasi-public purposes that we are
likely, in time, to approve. Might we not require the disclosure of
" The gene for sickle-cell trait is an example of such a phenomenon, since it also
codes for a protein that is protective against malaria. Graham R. Serjeant, Sickle-Cell
Disease, LvNCE, Sept. 6, 1997, at 725-30.
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genetic predispositions relevant to job qualifications where the work
involves severe health risks to which some, though not all, people are
highly susceptible? What if disclosure is the only means by which
tragic personal outcomes can be averted? What of jobs involving
substantial risks to the public? Might we not want airline pilots or
rescue personnel who are at unusually high risk of stroke or heart
attack screened off?
B. The Curse of Unintended Consequences
As we view it, the emerging regime of genetic privacy is riven with
compromises that not only weaken its moral force, as we argue in the
following Part, but also cripple its practical function. The principal
normative reason for these infirmities is that the regime itself
represents the uneasy merger of two conflicting impulses embedded
in the regulatory framework. The autonomy-promoting impulse of
the privacy regime seeks to encourage individuals to draw on the
wealth of genetic information that promises to flow from the current
revolution in biological research, and to use it for their physical,
psychological, and even financial benefit. Indeed, unless large
numbers of people utilize genetic information, the vast investment of
public and private resources in genomic research may never be
recouped. Yet, the paternalistic impulse that drives the regulatory
engine seeks also to envelop market actors in a shroud of enforced
genetic ignorance. The attempt to unify these two impulses produces
an unstable equilibrium, characterized by a steadily increasing
asymmetry of information, motivation, and behavior, that may well
prove to be the system's undoing.
One of the most seductive-and insidious-features of the
antidiscrimination regime is the fact that its behavioral distortions will
manifest themselves only gradually. In the near term-the next few
years, perhaps-prohibitions on genetic discrimination in health
insurance and employment may cause barely a ripple on the surface
of those markets. During this period, the number of people
undergoing genetic testing, although growing rapidly in absolute
terms, will continue to be small in relative terms. In most cases,
individuals will be tested only to help diagnose conditions for which
symptoms have already manifested, or to help predict the onset of
conditions already indicated by personal or family histories. Testing
will rarely produce information about conditions that could not
already be discovered from currently available sources. Given the
relatively small numbers of persons identified as having any particular
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genotype, moreover, the state of epidemiological research will remain
too crude to improve very much on the accuracy with which one can
forecast the onset of a disease or condition from more traditional
sources.
Thus, in the very short run, employers will, despite their protests,
manage to function quite acceptably without having access to genetic
testing results. They will continue, as at present, to cull from available
evidence of physical or psychological symptoms, past job
performance, medical tests, family histories, and the like, the
information that they consider necessary to screen job applicants and
workers. The health insurance market will experience even less
disturbance.-'2 Most health insurance is provided through groups,
usually employer-based, which are experience-rated. Thus, group
health insurers-including the large number of employers who self-
insure-will, in the short run, have little reason to access the genetic
test results of group members. Even in the individual health
insurance markets, insurers will continue to rely on existing
procedures for risk underwriting to separate applicants into tolerably
accurate and stable risk classifications.
The distortions will become more noticeable in the middle term,
as the focus of genetic testing shifts from diagnosis to prediction, and
as the availability, reliability, and affordability of testing improves. In
this stage of the evolutionary process, a much larger proportion of the
population will be in possession of what they may surely consider to be
negative genetic information. They will be aware of their
susceptibility to various diseases or other functional impairments,
including many that would not otherwise be indicated by traditional
sources of medical information. Epidemiological research will
improve to the point that we can establish links between particular
genotypes and phenotypes with greater confidence and thus
strengthen our ability to estimate the probability, severity, and timing
of disease onset.
This second evolutionary period will thus be characterized by a
widespread asymmetry of negative genetic information between
See MOSELEY ET AL., supra note 8, at 9-11 (discussing limitations on the
expansion of genetic testing).
S ' Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Laws Restricting Health Insurers' Use of Genetic
Information: Impact on Genetic Discrimination, 66 AM.J. HU,,. GENETICS 293, 302 (2000)
(concluding that most branches of the insurance industry do not inquire about genetic
teting results); Joan Stephenson, Genetic Test Information Fears Unfounded, 282 JAMA
2197, 2197 (1999) (suggesting that fear about genetic discrimination by insurance
companies is "largely unsubstantiated").
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individual subjects and those with whom they deal. The consequences
will be felt most strongly in the individual health insurance market,
which is the segment most susceptible to adverse selection.""
Customary protections against adverse selection-individual
underwriting, combined with preexisting conditions exclusions,
deductibles, and coinsurance provisions-will prove less and less
effective as a means of sorting applicants into actuarially sound risk
classifications .' Cross-subsidization between low-risk insureds and
high-risk insureds will intensify. Unable to sort high-risks into high-
premium risk classifications, insurers will respond by increasing
premiums or restricting coverage across the board. Higher premiums
will begin to drive many low-income, high-risk insureds and many
lower-risk insureds of all income groups from the market.
In the group insurance market, these distortions will be tempered
by the homogenizing tendencies of experience rating. Although
many group members will possess better information about negative
genetic risks and thus have an incentive to overconsume insurance
coverage, the lower-risk members of the group will, in most cases, be
dissuaded from exiting the pool by a combination of risk aversion,
group cohesion, and the fiscal advantages fostered by the tax and
group subsidies characteristic of most group insurance plans. Still,
many employers-especially small business entities and those in
health-sensitive industries-will begin to feel the impact of adverse
selection in the escalation of their group insurance premiums or, if
they self-insure, their group loss experience, putting pressure on them
to cut benefits or to step up efforts to screen out high-risk workers by
more aggressive selection or monitoring procedures.
The full extent of market distortions such as these will become
manifest in the still longer term, which, given the accelerating rate of
scientific progress, will arrive sooner than we think. By that third
evolutionary stage, most Americans will have legally protected access
to inexpensive "multiplex" genetic tests that provide reliable
information about their susceptibility to hundreds of health
53 On adverse selection in insurance markets, see generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAs-M,
DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 15-16 (1986).
The prospect of escalating adverse selection has led the insurance industry to oppose
legislative restrictions on the use of genetic information. See AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INS.
& THE HEALTH INS. AS'N OF AM., REPORT OF THE ACLI-HIAA TASK FORCE ON
GENETIC TESTING 8 (1991) (detailing the industry's concerns about the potential for
adverse selection if insurers were to be denied access to the results of genetic tests
already known to the applicant).
See infra text accompanying note 79.
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conditions and impairments, including both rare and common
diseases. " What distinguishes this final stage of the genetics
revolution is the extent to which not only adverse selection, but
"favorable deselection" becomes possible. People will have the
informational tools to sort themselves into categories ranging from
below-average to above-average health risks. To an extent never
before possible, individuals will have the basis for determining where
they rank in the genetic lottery of life.
The individual health insurance market will come under intense
pressure. According to the "hard-determinist" view of genetics, 6
genetic information will yield predictions so precise and
individualized as to destroy the very rationale for insurance' Butone
need not be a genetic determinist (and we are not) to see how the
tin forces of adverse selection and favorable deselection could
literally tear the individual health insurance market apart. Armed
with reliable evidence of their genetic predispositions, high-risk
individuals will rush to obtain increased coverage at standard rates,
while their better-endowed neighbors will flee from subsidizing such
coverage. To stem the exodus by the latter group, insurers will be
forced either to engage in legally evasive tactics, such as "field
underwiting,"'- to exclude high-risk applicants from coverage, or to
design low-cost, low-coverage policies designed to capture the lower-
risk segments of the market. As several commentators have predicted,
the twin forces of adverse selection and favorable deselection may
propel the individual health insurance market into a "death spiral"
from which it cannot escape.59 But even if the market is able to
See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Multiplex Genetic
Testing, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,July-Aug. 1998, at 15, 15-16 (predicting that, as tests for
newly discovered genes are developed, there will be the possibility of administering
simultaneously many different "testing packages").
See generally P.S. Greenspan, Free Will and the Genome Project, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
31 (1993) (defining determinism and its relationship to free will in the context of the
Human Genome Project).
: For a plausible rendering of this development that is more fully detailed than
ours, see Roberta M. Berry, The Human Genome Project and the End of Insurance, 7 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205, 231-32 (1996).
" For a catalog of such practices, see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Private or Public
Approaches to Insuring the Uninsured: Lessons from International Experience with Private
Insurance, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419,479-81 (2001).
" See Berry, supra note 57, at 231-32 (discussing adverse selection and genetic
discrimination); Deborah J. Chollet, Consumers, Insurers, and Market Behavior, 25 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 27, 37 (2000) (discussing the -vulnerability of the individual
insurance market to an adverse selection spiral); John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health
Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 311, 398 (1997) (discussing risk adjustment).
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achieve some sort of equilibrium, coverage will be so limited in scope
or so expensive as to be practically useless to the vast majority of
Americans.
The disturbances occasioned by widespread adverse selection and
favorable deselection will not be limited to individual health
insurance markets. Even in the more protected preserves of group
insurance, the effect of sorting by risk will inevitably be felt. Knowing
that their premiums subsidize higher-risk group members, low-risk
individuals will reduce the level of their coverage by increasing
deductibles or coinsurance, or by selecting less extensive coverage. If
such options are not available under their group plan, they will lobby
group administrators to offer them. Under any reasonable
assumption about the distribution of risk levels within insurance
groups, low-risk members will surely exercise sufficient influence to
induce compliance with their demands.0° And if they do not succeed
in broadening the range of options available to them, many, especially
healthier younger workers in lower paying jobs, may simply opt out of
their plans altogether, pulling their premium contributions out of the
cross-subsidizing pool.6
Faced with the prospect of rising health insurance costs and
productivity losses from adverse selection, employers, too, will be
pressured to take action to protect their competitive positions. Some
will search for legal proxies for forbidden categories of information so
that, unimpeded, they can screen out genetically disadvantaged
Professor Greely appears dry-eyed in contemplating the death of the individual
insurance market, which, by his estimate, affects ten to twenty million Americans.
Greely, supra note 49, at 1489. Others cheer from the sidelines, based on the
assumption that only the complete collapse of the private health insurance market will
produce the political will to establish a needed national health insurance system. But
the mature liberal democracies whose lead these commentators would have us follow
have been forced to rely on a back-up system of private health insurance to ameliorate
political discontent with coverage limitations and rationing, which are endemic to
national plans. Thus, unless the individual health insurance market were to prove
capable of resurrection after death, there seems no ground for optimism about
universal health coverage's substitute appeal.
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE? 127 (1997) (attacking government solutions to persistent problems in health
care access and delivery).
61 Evidence of this proposition is provided by recent experience in New York.
Enactment of legislation requiring community rating of individual health insurance
policies precipitated a massive exodus of younger insureds from the market. See Mark
A. Hall, An Evaluation of Nev York's Reform Law, 25J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 71, 76
(2000) (discussing the effects of reform); Robert Pear, Pooling Risks and Sharing Costs in
Effort To Gain Stable Insurance Rates, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1994, at 22 (discussing risk
spreading).
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applicants. Many may restrict their hiring to applicants who self-
identify as having a clean bill of genetic health, meanwhile presuming
that those who do not so identify must be harboring incriminating
information. If the legal regime responds by trying to outlaw this
practice-a position that will be hard to justify politically and still
harder to enforce practically-employers will simply search for lawful
means by which to induce the genetically favored to signal their status.
For example, employers may restructure compensation policies to
increase wages or other nonhealth benefits and correspondingly
reduce health insurance benefits.
If these strategies fail, or if the law responds once again, this time
by requiring the provision of some minimal level of health insurance
coverage, employers might react by substituting part-time for full-time
labor. Alternatively, they might reduce labor requirements by
automating production, relocating production to regions populated
by younger or healthier workers, or moving production facilities
offshore."" To the extent that health care coverage remains tied to
employment, the antidiscrimination strategy will thus have produced
the perverse effect of reducing the level of health insurance
protection for many people, especially those most in need.
There is, of course, no assurance that the scenario will play out
precisely this way. A forecast such as this is too sensitive to
unsubstantiated empirical assumptions to be offered on more than a
tentative basis. But it is a scenario that seems sufficiently plausible to
give pause to enthusiasts for the emerging privacy regime. To their
credit, some defenders of the privacy regime acknowledge these
problems and point toward possible reforms. But beyond the search
for regulatory fixes, the rather grim prognosis sketched above ought
to motivate a much more searching examination of the underlying
normative justifications for the current regime. That is the
'' See Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old
P&"ponses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1994) (describing some of the
strategies firms will adopt "to cut their losses in a world that regards concealment...
[as an] employee ['s] birthright").
See generally Rothstein, supra note 46 (discussing why the protection of genetic
prixacy and confidentiality is so elusive).
Discussants at the Yale Law and Technology workshop offered the hope that
consumers of genetic testing might gain sufficient reassurance from the current
regime to effectuate personal information-gathering norms that might then survive the
regime's collapse, a silver-lining approach to the dark cloud of regulatory failure. The
point is debatable, for certain, though the authors worry that since the current regime
cannot deliver on its promises, the dark cloud of failure will reveal a second dark
cloud: popular disillusionment and despair.
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examination we begin in the following Part of this essay.
II. NORMATIVE RESERVATIONS
A. Allocative Efficiency
Voluntary exchange between two willing and informed individuals
is the paradigm of efficiency-enhancing transactions. Each party
experiences a net increase in utility by surrendering something that
she values in exchange for something that she values even more.
Thus, according to most versions of utilitarian or social welfarist
ethics, society should not only permit, but indeed encourage, its
members to engage in voluntary transactions. Any form of
government regulation, such as a prohibition on "genetic
discrimination," that interferes with the terms on which individuals
may contract, is thus presumptively efficiency-reducing.
The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. "Market failures" such
as coercion, information asymmetries, or harmful externalities may
cause individuals to enter into transactions that reduce their own
welfare or that of third parties.64 But government regulation-
especially regulation that denies to one contracting party information
in the possession of the other-is rarely an efficient response to such
market failures. In view of the inevitable distortions and costs of
government regulation, its advocates always bear a heavy burden of
persuasion. We argue in this Part that advocates for a ban on genetic
discrimination in employment and insurance cannot bear that
burden. Prima facie, such a prohibition imposes significant efficiency
losses on those markets and those losses cannot be justified by the
claimed offsetting benefits.
1. Employment
Information derived from genetic testing can improve the
productivity of labor-and therefore the efficiency of labor markets-
in two ways. First, it can improve the match between the qualifications
of individual workers and the requirements of particular jobs.
Second, it can facilitate more cost-effective investments in human
capital. Employers currently invest vast resources in the screening and
64 For thoughtful analyses of these and other conditions, see generally Matthew D.
Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE LJ. 165 (1999);
Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto
Principle, 110 YALE LJ. 173 (2000).
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selection of workers. For many, medical screening, based on
information gleaned from questionnaires, personal histories, and
medical examinations, is an indispensable part of that process.6' The
new era of genetic information holds the promise of improving
significantly on the reliability and accuracy of such information.
Armed with genetic test results and corresponding epidemiological
data on the correlation between genotype and phenotype, employers
may be able to improve the quality of the predictions they can make
about the two determinants ofjob performance: intensity and quality
of effort.
Some advocates for genetic privacy question the incremental value
of genetic testing information in screening and evaluating employees.
They argue that existing sources of information already enable
employers to make such predictions at an acceptable level of accuracy.
The best predictor of future performance, they claim, is past
performance (where such information is available). Employers can
monitor and measure employee performance and discharge or retrain
underperforming workers. A related argument stresses the distinction
between symptomatic and asymptomatic conditions. Workers, the
argument goes, should not be evaluated until a condition manifests
itself. At that time, the employer can determine the appropriate
course of action, including sick leave, treatment, reassignment, and, if
output declines excessively, removal.
These arguments fail adequately to account for transaction costs.
Hiring or promoting an underqualified or underproductive worker is
inevitably costly to the employer. Reliance on ex post monitoring of
performance is costly. In some situations, the quality and quantity of a
worker's output can be easily observed and verified, and remedial
action readily taken. But in most situations, that is not the case.
Monitoring and corrective action require investment in supervision,
and often require changes in production design or scheduling. In the
meantime, the underperforming worker inflicts on the organization
both demoralization costs and the opportunity costs of foregone
output. For these reasons, it is almost always in the employer's
interest to establish better ex ante screening mechanisms so as to
select workers who will require less supervision and corrective action.
In making the optimal tradeoff between ex ante screening and ex
See MAIRK A. ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING AND THE EMPLOYEE HEALTH COST
CRISIS 1 (1989) (discussing the growing importance of medical screening); MARK A.
ROTHSTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING OF WORKERS 15-18 (1984) (discussing the various
methods for assessing a patient's current health status).
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post monitoring, the distinction between asymptomatic conditions
and symptomatic conditions is not controlling and may be irrelevant.
All employment decisions are predictive in nature and all evidence
used in making such decisions-whether based on job performance,
personal habits, manifested medical conditions, or genetic
predispositions-is probabilistic. What matters, from an allocative
point of view, is not whether specific symptoms of a disposition have
manifested, but the confidence with which one can predict that the
disposition will adversely affect job performance within the period of
the employee's predictedjob tenure.
The efficiency gains of a transparency regime do not stop with
improved employee selection. Genetic information surely holds the
promise of improving the productivity of the existing workforce, as
well. By identifying particular health risks, such information could
enable employers to design fitness or wellness programs to reduce
behaviors that may aggravate risk, to monitor indicators of employees'
health at regular intervals, to redesign production processes or the
workplace environment so as to reduce health risks, or to reassign
workers to tasks or work locations that reduce their exposure to such
hazards.'6 Likewise, genetic information may someday provide a more
reliable basis for measuring deficits in job-relevant skills that can be
corrected by the design of training programs.
Defenders of the privacy regime tend to be dismissive of this
category of efficiency improvements. Part of their skepticism may be
based on an empirical assumption that few employers in fact offer
fitness or wellness programs, or even training programs tailored to the
needs of particular workers. To the extent that this is the case, the
reason is often that employers lack information sufficient to identify
programs that would be cost-effective. By hypothesis, genetic
information may well fill that gap by permitting more accurate
diagnoses of conditions that affect worker productivity, as well as the
basis for more reliable predictions about the relationship between
genotype and job performance.
Critics also argue that giving employers the option of reassigning
workers with low tolerances to workplace hazards diminishes the
66 See, e.g., Gene-Environment Research Could Spur Increased Workplace Testing, Experts
Predict, 69 U.S.L.W. 2500 (Feb. 27, 2001). Indeed, employers may be forced to conduct
genetic testing to protect themselves from liability for exposing workers to hazards to
which they are genetically susceptible. For a survey of possible applications of genetic
testing to tort liability, see Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Susceptibility and Biomarkers in Toxic
Injury Litigation, 41JURIMETRICS 67 (2001).
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employer's incentive to remove those hazards from the workplace
altogether. That is undoubtedly true. But there is no reason to
suppose that all workplace hazards can be ameliorated more cost
effectively by engineering changes in the production process or
working environment than by personnel reassignments. Some people
are less tolerant of particular workplace conditions than others. No
one seriously claims that forklifts should be designed so that they can
be driven by sight-impaired persons or that buildings should be
designed so that steel frames could be erected by people with vertigo.
Most advocates for a privacy regime are willing to concede that
genetic information could be appropriately used in screening
employees for jobs that involve safety risks to the public or to fellow
employees. 7  But, from an allocative perspective, there is no
justification for this limitation. Unqualified workers can probably
impose much larger aggregate costs on society by wasting resources
and diminishing output than by causing personal injury or death.
Drawing a distinction between safety-related jobs and non-safety-
related jobs for purposes of permitting the use of genetic information
merely invites endless line-drawing, evasion, and litigation, without
serving a convincing efficienc3-promoting purpose.
Advocates for a ban on genetic discrimination might concede that
genetic test data can, if properly used, enhance the efficiency of labor
markets, for the reasons discussed above. But they argue that
employers are just as likely-perhaps more likely--to misuse such
information by irrationally screening out productive workers merely
because they have a genetic predisposition for some feared disease or
condition. To the extent that such economically irrational behavior
persists, a ban on genetic discrimination could actually improve social
welfare.
In support of this claim, privacy advocates cite studies that purport
to provide empirical evidence that employers are beginning to use
genetic information to screen out workers with particular genotypes.
As we discuss elsewhere, however, this literature is too anecdotal to
establish the extent or nature of genetic discrimination in the
workplace. Few claims of such discrimination have in fact been
systematically investigated, verified, or documented.9 Furthermore,
,7 See, eg., David Orentlicher, Genetic Screening by Employers, 263 JAMA 1005, 1008
(1990) (admitting that genetic testing for jobs bearing on public safety poses "[a]
more difficult question").
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
One well-publicized instance of alleged improper genetic testing in
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to the extent that employers have used genotypic evidence to screen
out certain persons from the workplace, we have no empirical
evidence to indicate whether these acts of discrimination were
"irrational" in the sense of being unrelated to bona fide occupational
criteria.
Perhaps the most straightforward refutation of the "irrational"
discrimination claim is that it flies in the face of economic logic. In a
competitive labor market, employers who persistently engage in
irrational behavior by excluding productive workers who happen to
have some genetic predisposition should be punished by market
forces.7° It is true, of course, that group-based discrimination can
persist in competitive labor markets, as the history of race-based and
gender-based employment discrimination vividly demonstrates. But
that undeniable-and undeniably deplorable-fact does not furnish a
basis for predicting a similar pattern of irrational discrimination by
genotype.
Commentators have advanced two theories to explain the
persistence of group-based discrimination in competitive labor
markets. The "statistical discrimination" theory posits that some
employers use observable traits, such as race, as proxies for
unobservable differences in individual productivity.7' Even to the
extent that statistical discrimination adequately explains racial or
gender discrimination, however, it has no obvious application to
genetic discrimination. Unlike race or gender, genetic predisposition
for disease is not usually a readily identifiable group proxy for
individual characteristics. Indeed, genetic test information holds the
promise of providing the very form of individualized prediction that
employment was brought to light in a recent complaint brought by the EEOC against
the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad. The EEOC alleged that the railroad was
violating the ADA by conducting genetic tests of workers complaining of carpal tunnel
syndrome, without informing the workers of the purpose of the tests. Railroad Agrees
To End Genetic Testing, After Disabiliy Discrimination Suit by EEOC, 69 U.S.L.W. 2490,
2490-91 (Feb. 20, 2001) (reporting on EEOC v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R, No. C01-
4013 (N.D. Iowa filed Feb. 9, 2001)). In response, the railroad agreed to terminate the
testing program, while denying any wrongdoing. Id.
See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14-15 (2d ed. 1971)
(analyzing the payment of forfeiture of income for the privilege to discriminate in the
marketplace).
71 E.g, Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 659, 659 (1972) (introducing "the statistical theory of racial (and sexual)
discrimination in the labor market"); Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination
Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 228, 228 (1986) (concluding that statistical discrimination
may be inefficient under certain conditions).
GENOPHOBIA
the statistical discrimination theory posits as unavailable.
Another set of theories offered to explain the persistence of
group-based employment discrimination focuses on a posited "taste"
for discrimination. According to this family of theories, an employer
discriminates against members of certain groups as a way of satisfying
a personal preference for discrimination, 72 achieving higher status
within his group, or minimizing the costs of employee diversity and
divisiveness.7' As we argue below,75 by contrast, there is no reason to
believe that people have a widespread aversion to most diseases or
other conditions that might be predicted by genetic information.
Genotype per se is not a basis for "invidious" discrimination, even if
some conditions linked to genotype (such as race) are. Given the
enormous diversity of genetic characteristics and the hidden nature of
most genotypes, one cannot plausibly assert that genetic aversion is an
argument in the preference functions of most people. Therefore, we
see no basis for applying these theories to the field of genetic
discrimination.
2. Insurance
Information from genetic testing can improve the efficiency of
health insurance markets by enabling insurers to classify risks more
accurately and thus equate the price of coverage to its value.
Confronted by an actuarially fair premium, the prospective insured
can, in turn, more accurately determine whether the utility gained
from coverage exceeds the utility sacrificed by the payment of the
premium. She can thereby make better decisions concerning the
amount and kind of insurance coverage to buy as well as the optimal.... 76
level of investment in other health-promoting activities.
See BECKER, supra note 70, at 14-15 (describing rational discrimination when in
the form of nepotism).
7, Sre Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Peoductin and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1007 (1995).
71 Se RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LxWs 60-72 (1992).
Sce infra Part II.B.2.
Like other forms of insurance, health insurance creates an incentive to
overconsume health care services and to underconsume various preventive measures,
such as exercise, diet change, and avoidance of risky activities. See Martin Gaynor et al.,
An Invi~ibh Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second-Best in Health
Caw' Markets, 108 J. POL. ECON. 992, 993 (2000) (discussing moral hazard effects on
consumption due to health insurance); Richard Zeckhauser, Medical Insurance: A Case
Study ( the Tradeoff Between Risk Spreading and Appropriate Incentives, 2J. ECON. THEORY
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Genetic privacy advocates argue that insurers can achieve a
tolerable level of allocative efficiency without recourse to genetic
testing information. Their argument has two parts. First, to the
extent that private health insurers do engage in individual rating (in
the sale of nongroup, individual insurance policies), there are other
means available to them to achieve economically efficient risk
classification. Second, most private health insurance is sold to groups
(primarily employment groups), achieving higher levels of efficiency,
at least from the insurer's perspective, by basing premiums on the
collective loss experience of the group and not on the individual
characteristics of its members.
It is true, as the privacy advocates claim, that the presence of
adverse selection does not necessarily impair the efficient operation of
individual health insurance markets. Heretofore, insurers have
protected themselves against the distortions produced by information
asymmetry by using such techniques as medical underwriting,
exclusion of preexisting conditions, and the structure of deductibles
and coinsurance provisions.77 Widespread private availability of
genetic information, however, will severely test the effectiveness of
these techniques. Genetic testing will give individuals access to vastly
more complete information about not only the presence of otherwise
invisible risk factors, but also the probabilities regarding the timing
and severity of their expression. Armed with such information, they
may be able to make much more accurate estimates of their insurance
risks than will those who underwrite those risks. Persons who know
that they are in an elevated risk category will thus have an even
stronger incentive than at present to increase their insurance
coverage, so long as insurers are unable to identify them in advance as
high-risk and are therefore unable to place them in appropriate risk
classifications. 7s
Likewise, preexisting condition exclusions and coinsurance
provisions will prove increasingly impotent as weapons to combat the
10, 10 (1970) (arguing for a compromise featuring some risk-spreading and some
incentive). Any policy that causes people to overconsume health insurance (by
underpricing coverage) exacerbates these deadweight losses.
The classic theoretical demonstration of this point can be found in Michael
Rothschild &Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essa on the
Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976).
78 See RobertJ. Pokorski, Use of Genetic Information by Private Insurers, inJUSTIcE AND
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 91, 91 (Thomas F. Murphy & Marc A. Lapp6 eds., 1994)
(arguing that "genetic information must be made available to insurers as a matter of
equity").
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allocative distortions caused by adverse selection. Even if preexisting
exclusions could be legally applied to asymptomatic genetic
predispositions, they would be difficult to enforce in a regime of
legally protected genetic privacy. And, at the extreme, their
widespread adoption would virtually destroy the utility of health
insurance, effectively converting it into accident insurance. Similarly,
in the coming genetic era, coinsurance provisions will prove to be
ineffectual to induce applicants to sort themselves into actuarially
sound risk classifications. By themselves, coinsurance provisions and
deductibles are simply too crude an instrument to handle the
expanded range of healthcare risks revealed by the new forms of
genetic information."
As a consequence, the asymmetrical treatment of genetic
information by the incoming privacy regime almost surely diminishes
the allocative efficiency of individual health insurance markets. The
precise magnitude and direction of this effect are difficult to predict,
but one of two scenarios seems inevitable. In one, the individual
health insurance market will settle into a fragile equilibrium
characterized by massive misclassification and mispricing of risk, with
attendant invisible cross-subsidies and deadweight losses. In the
other, the market will spin out of control and disappear altogether,
thereby denying a large segment of the population access to a utility-
enhancing source of financial protection.
As compared to individually rated health insurance, group health
insurance achieves allocative efficiency, from the point of view of the
insurer, but sacrifices efficiency from the point of -view of the insured.
Insurers are able to make a competitive profit to the extent that
experience rating provides a reliable basis for predicting the group's
future loss experience. Because the individual premiums are uniform
in most group policies, however, most individuals in a group pay
either too much or too little for the coverage that they receive. The
high-risk members of the group tend to overconsume health
insurance and the low-risk members underconsume health insurance.
Overconsumers have an incentive to invest too little in alternative
Sep Michael Smart, Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobseroabls, 41 INT'L
ECON. REv. 153, 153 (2000) (demonstrating that coinsurance can achieve an efficient
separation of insureds by relative risk only if insureds vary along only one dimension of
piate information); cf. M. Susan Marquis, Adverse Selection with a Multiple Choice Among
H'alth Insurance Plans: A Simulation Analysis, 11 J. HEALTH ECON. 129, 131 (1992)
(arguing that in a competitive market, high-option health insurance plans will be
driven out of the market by adverse selection).
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means of reducing health risk, such as changing diet, physical
exercise, and abstinence from risky behaviors, while underconsumers
have the opposite incentive.
The advent of genetic testing information, if available to both
parties, would almost surely increase the overall efficiency of group
insurance markets. Initially, such information would have no impact
on the behavior of insurers, since group insurance is not individually
underwritten. But such information would have an impact on the
behavior of group members. As genetic information enables
individuals to sort themselves more accurately by relative risk, the
high-risk group will, at the margin, increase their demand for
insurance coverage, while lower-risk individuals will, at the margin,
decrease their demand. To the extent that the group administrator
offers choices of coverage, or can be induced to do so by pressure
from the low-risks, the uniformity of the current group insurance
regime will gradually break down. Insureds will sort themselves by risk
levels, defined by differential coverage and premium levels. From the
perspective of insureds, then, the overall allocative efficiency of the
group insurance system will increase as the group insurance market
comes to resemble more closely the individual health insurance
market.
A prohibition on the use of genetic information by group insurers
might, therefore, have efficiency-reducing effects for the same reasons
that such a prohibition would distort efficiency in individual insurance
markets. The growing asymmetry in information between insureds
and insurers might hamper efforts of insurers to classify individuals
accurately by risk and to price insurance products appropriately.
Unlike the individual health insurance market, the group market is
much less likely to collapse because tax and employer subsidies,
combined perhaps with group solidarity, will prevent a mass exodus by
the low-risk. The resulting equilibrium will, however, surely be less
efficient than a market premised on full transparency of genetic
information.
3. Discouraging Genetic Testing
Many privacy advocates argue that welfare losses caused by
distortion of employment and insurance markets will be offset by
welfare gains produced by removing an impediment to genetic
testing. They claim that many people are likely to be discouraged
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from seeking genetic testing for fear that adverse results will be
disclosed to, or demanded by, prospective employers and insurers.""
By removing this fear, a legal prohibition on the use of genetic test
data in insurance and employment would thus unleash the
therapeutic and ameliorative benefits that could flow from widespread
use of predictive genetic testing.
Whether overall utility would be enhanced by such a prohibition
is, however, debatable. When a person decides not to undergo
genetic testing, she is presumably deciding that her net utility would
be reduced: that is, that the costs (including not only the direct cost
of undergoing the testing, but also the expected adverse impact that
the resulting knowledge would produce on both her economic
prospects and her psychological state) outweigh the benefits (in terms
of the improvement in her, and perhaps her offspring's, health that
could result from ameliorative actions). By protecting individuals
from adverse employment and insurance consequences, the
antidiscrimination strategy eliminates two components of the
economic cost of testing from the individual's cost-benefit calculus. In
so doing, the government in effect encourages overconsumption of
genetic testing.
Suppose, by analogy, that the government required property
insurers to provide flood damage insurance at deeply subsidized rates.
In so doing, the government would encourage people to overbuild on
flood plains. It is no answer to say that genetic testing is a good thing,
and building on flood plains is not. Whether genetic testing should
be undertaken depends on its costs and benefits. These costs and
benefits will -ary widely from individual to individual. For many risk-
averse people, testing is psychologically very costly.8' Presumptively,
those people-not the state acting on their behalf-should make the
decision whether to incur the costs. As with any comparable decision,
the goal of allocative efficiency will be served only if, in making that
decision, they address the true social costs and true social benefits of
their actions.
One answer to this argument might be that individuals lack
- See Capron, supra note 29, at 248 ("The chief concern is that health insurance
companies will, by policy or chance, accumulate genetic test data regarding specific
patients, which will then be available to these companies... when these patients apply
for new.., insurance policies."); Kimberly A. Quad & Michael Morris, Reluctance To
Undergo Predictive Testing: The Case of Huntington Disease, 45 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 41,
43-44 (1993) (listing the potential loss of health insurance as one of the main reasons
people choose not to be tested).
' Se supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (discussing the nocebo effect).
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sufficient knowledge to determine what is in their best interest. For
example, an individual may be misinformed about the probability that
she will be found to have a particular genetic condition, or she may
overestimate the adverse health or economic consequences of having
such a condition, or she may overestimate the difficulty of preventing
or ameliorating the condition. To the extent that this is the problem,
however, the appropriate regulatory response should be to provide
better information by mandating or subsidizing genetic counseling,
for example, so that the individual can make a more informed
decision about whether to undergo genetic testing.
A plausibly better answer is to say that genetic testing can produce
positive externalities. By obtaining confirmation of a genetic
predisposition, a person may be able to protect her offspring from
inheriting that condition. Ordinarily, however, we leave it up to
individuals to decide what is in the best interests of their children. We
give parents wide latitude in deciding where and how to live, what to
feed their children, what type and level of health care to provide
them, and so forth. Public policy steps in, as in the context of
mandatory inoculation against certain diseases, only when the benefits
clearly and consistently outweigh the costs. On this rationale, most
states already mandate prenatal genetic screening for such conditions
as PKU or sickle-cell trait.82 To the extent that we identify other
genetic conditions for which prospective parents clearly ought to test,
the appropriate policy response is either to mandate testing or to
subsidize testing for those conditions.
Whatever the source of the "market failure" that might prevent
people from making optimal decisions about whether to undergo
genetic testing, in short, the antidiscrimination strategy is surely one
of the least attractive policy instruments for curing that defect. Unlike
the provision of additional information, or the subsidizing or
mandating of particularly beneficial forms of testing, the prohibitory
strategy provides at best only a partial and uncertain incentive for
testing and, in the process, distorts the efficiency of two additional
markets: employment and insurance. For these reasons, we conclude
that the encouragement of genetic testing does not provide a
convincing welfare-based argument to prohibit the use of genetic test
results in employment or insurance.
See, e.g., IASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 76, § 15B (1991) (dealing with screening
programs, testing, and limiting disclosure for sickle-cell trait and related genetically
linked diseases).
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B. Equality of Opportunity
Few advocates for the emerging regime of genetic privacy ground
their position on the principle of allocative efficiency.83 Rather, they
base their policy recommendation on a principle of distributive justice
deriving from egalitarian ethics. The most widely accepted version of
egalitarianism posits that every human being deserves an equal
opportunity to achieve her potential or her life's goals and that a just
society, therefore, has a moral obligation to redress barriers to equal
opportunity."' Ethicists have distinguished several versions of the
equal opportunity principle, ranging from a simple prohibition on the
erection of unequal legal barriers, all the way to a requirement of
affirmative action to correct inequalities. : Virtually all theories of
equal opportunity posit that individuals should not suffer social
disadvantages as a result of factors beyond their control. A person's
success in the "race of life" should be determined, not by the "brute
luck" of the natural or social lottery, but only by the extent to which
she uses her talents and opportunities. One deserves, by this account,
only what one chooses.i6 One does not morally deserve unchosen and
uncontrollable attributes, nor the adverse consequences that flow
from possessing such attributes.
Being born with a genetic predisposition for disease or some
other severely dysfunctional condition is a paradigmatic example of
bad moral luck. Thus, the brute luck theory clearly implies that the
But see Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care
lirimation, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1997) (arguing that regulation of health care
information privacy is an efficient response to transaction costs and other market
failures).
' See, .g., JOHN RAxIS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 73-78 (rev. ed. 1999) (discussing
"fair equality of opportunity-); JOHN E. ROEMER, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNIT' 5 (1998)
(noting that -the purpose of an equal-opportunity policy is to level the playing field");
AM!AREA SEN, INEQUALiTy REEXAMINED 4-5 (1992) (arguing for equality of a "person's
capability to achieve functionings that he or she has reason to value"). The principal
c intemporary rival to the theory of equal opportunity is Ronald Dworkin's theory of
"equality of resources." RONALD M. DwORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 65-119 (2000). Since Dworkin includes mental and physical
powers among the "resources" that ajust society should equalize, his theory has similar
implications for the treatment of genetic disadvantages. See id. at 433-36 (asserting that
a national health care system is the only proper way to deal with the inherent
inequality of genetics).
See ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE
65-67 (2000); Allen Buchanan, Equal Opportunity and Genetic Intervention, 12 SOc. PHIL.
& POL'Y 105, 109-10 (1995) (analyzing theories of equality and equal opportunity).
". Se-, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 84 at 73, 287, 341 (distinguishing deliberate
gambles from chance without choice).
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genetically unlucky should have a claim to some sort of compensator),
treatment to offset their innate disadvantage. But what sort of
compensatory treatment? And against whom can they make such a
claim? Without more, the brute luck version of egalitarianism does
not provide answers. The mere fact that a person has suffered a
misfortune, even a grievous misfortune, does not, by itself, entitle her
to demand whatever form of remedy she likes from any person or
institution of her choosing.
A policy that forbids the use of information relevant to an
individual's employability or insurability selectively conscripts private
parties into the process of subsidizing that individual. Those
conscripted parties, moreover, include not only impersonal economic
organizations, but real people as well. Suppose, for example, that a
job applicant obtains a job despite knowing-and, indeed,
concealing-information that would reveal limitations on pro-
ductivity. The advantage gained by such a person comes at the
expense of not only the employer, but also another disappointed job
applicant who is presumably better qualified for the job. Indeed, if a
ban on using genetic information makes it more difficult for
employers to verify the accuracy of the health-related questions that
they are permitted by law to ask, then the policy may have the
consequence of benefiting the dishonest at the expense of the
honest.17 Likewise, adverse selection in insurance penalizes not only
the insurance company, but also other insured persons, a portion of
whose premiums must contribute to the subsidy.
Ordinarily in our moral order, a victim of misfortune can make a
claim only against a private party who can fairly be said to have either
caused her plight or consented in fact to bear responsibility for her
protection.8 How, then, can a victim of genetic misfortune be
considered morally entitled to demand employment or insurance, at
the cost of corporations or individuals who have, by hypothesis,
neither caused her genetic impairment nor consented to bear
responsibility for its alleviation? The prohibitionist literature suggests
87 See Epstein, supra note 62, at 8-13 (arguing that genetic privacy protection can
be a means of facilitating, and indeed, encouraging fraud).
88 Richard Epstein has made this point in many of his writings. See, e.g., EPSTEIN,
supra note 60 (arguing against a legal requirement that private employers or insurers
provide subsidized coverage for those without health insurance); Richard A. Epstein, A
Theory of Strict Liability, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973). In particular, Epstein's criticism
of the emerging regime of genetic privacy prefigures several of the arguments we make
in this piece, including the ways in which such a policy distorts markets and interferes
with individual liberty in the name of collective duty. See Epstein, supra note 62.
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two answers: the argument that health insurance and employment
are "necessities" and the argument that genetic discrimination is
closely akin to other forms of morally condemned invidious
discrimination. We find neither claim to be persuasive. The fact that
a particular good is a "necessity" does not, by itself, alter the
presumption against selective coerced altruism. Even if it did, the
antidiscrimination rule is a singularly inappropriate mechanism for
matching the remedy to the need. As for the "invidious
discrimination" argument, we find the analogy between, say, racial
discrimination and genetic discrimination unconvincing. The
historical and social realities that justify moral condemnation of the
former simply do not apply with comparable moral force to the latter.
1. Necessity
The brute luck version of equal opportunity argues that a just
society should readjust the point from which the genetically unlucky
begin the race. One plausible way to accomplish this objective is to
provide to every individual at least a minimal allotment of goods and
services deemed indispensable to the pursuit of life's goals. Among
such goods and services, so it could be argued, are health insurance
and employment.' Whether health insurance and employment are
truly "necessities" is, of course, debatable. " Their importance is a
matter not so much of biological necessity as social or cultural
contingency. Still, a credible argument can be made that in the
context of contemporary America, health insurance and employment
should be considered as essential ingredients of a decent life. In a
world of unpredictable health risks and highly specialized, expensive
health care, health insurance should be understood as an essential
1" The "necessity" argument has been made most often in the context of health
insurance. See, e.g., Martin Johnston, Selling Souls: Ethical Theory and Commercialisation
of Cnetic Iformation, in GENETIC INFORMATION: ACQUISITION, ACCESS, AND CONTROL
79 (Alison K. Thompson & Ruth F. Chadwick, eds., 1999).
- See Trudo Lemmens, Private Parties, Public Duties? The Shifting Role of Insurance
Co panies in the Genetics Era, in GENETIC INFORLMATION: ACQUIsITION, ACCESS, AND
CONTROL 31 (Alison K. Thompson & Ruth F. Chadwick eds., 1999) (arguing that
health insurance has not yet completed the transition from private market good to
social necessity). It is difficult to maintain that health insurance is regarded as a
nccessity in a nation, such as the United States, in which over 44 million people are
uninsured. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 1998, at 1 (1999).
Even less can it plausibly be argued that a job is a necessity, given the persistence of
unemployment (albeit at historically low levels in recent years) and the lack of public
job programs or subsidies to assure private employment of the unemployed and the
underemployed.
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means of protecting people against crippling financial losses-
including losses occasioned by the very sorts of conditions for which
the brute luck theory seeks to compensate. Likewise, in a
postagrarian, postartisanal economy dominated by large productive
enterprises, employment is the primary means by which people can
achieve not only financial independence, but also personal dignity
and self-fulfillment.
There are three objections to this argument. First, the
classification of health care and employment as "necessities" does not,
by itself, alter our general moral skepticism about compelled
altruism.9' After all, if a drowning man cannot demand that a passer-
by save his life-the ultimate "necessity"-why can a genetically,
disfavored person demand that a particular insurer offer him
subsidized insurance or a particular employer offer him a subsidized
job? Second, the necessity argument suffers from the general
theoretical objection to social provision of "merit goods."''
Individuals-even genetically disadvantaged individuals-attach dif-
fering values to goods such as health insurance coverage or
employment, or for that matter, other necessities such as food,
shelter, and health care itself. Those who are severely genetically
disadvantaged, for example, might place an especially high value on
access to high-limits health, disability, or even life insurance. Those
who are mildly disadvantaged might place a higher value on access to
a high-paying or particularly secure job. Given the diversity of
preferences in any population, the ethically superior means of
providing even "necessities" is a cash subsidy, not merit goods.
Third, even if one accepts that society has an obligation to provide
employment and health insurance protection, the antidiscrimination
strategy is particularly ill-suited to serving that goal. It is not enough
for society to classify a good as a "necessity"; it must also specify the
quantity or quality of that good to which individuals are minimally
91 On the justifications for the "no-duty-to-rescue" rule of tort law, see Epstein,
supra note 88, at 198-200; James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67
CORNELL L. REv. 901, 928-43 (1982). Some theorists have called for creation of a
limited duty to rescue. See, e.g., ErnestJ. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty To Rescue, 90 YALE
L.J. 247, 251 (1980) (calling for recognition of a duty of "easy rescue").
92 See Richard A. Musgrave, Merit Goods, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS 452 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (discussing multiple meanings of
the term "merit goods" and the extent to which most of them involve overriding
individual consumer preferences); see also RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF
LAW 511-13 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing the relative advantages of cash transfers and in-
kind benefits).
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entitled. Food may be a necessity but a six-course meal at Le
Bernardin is not. The minimum-benefits approach to equal
opportunity has been worked out most fully in the context of health
insurance, where egalitarians have argued that the state should
provide every citizen protection against the consequences of the most
common and devastating of health risks. " We are fully sympathetic
with such a position. But we do not believe that the unrefined
application of an antidiscrimination policy is the appropriate means
for achieving that result. Assuming that some minimal level of health
insurance coverage is a necessity, the government should provide the
benefit directly, as it does (albeit imperfectly) in the Medicare or
Medicaid programs, or indirectly through some form of subsidy or tax
benefit. In this way, the government can target the benefit to those
who need it, in the precise amount or level they need, and only for as
long as they need it.
The prohibitionist strategy, by contrast, is indiscriminate. It
provides a (hidden) subsidy to any person who might be
discriminated against for genetic reasons, regardless of financial or
other need. More importantly, the antidiscrimination policy
subsidizes the purchase of any level of insurance that the beneficiary
might choose to obtain, not merely some basic minimum level of
coverage. Because the value of the implicit subsidy surely increases as
the level of coverage increases, such a policy gives beneficiaries an
incentive to consume far more than the level of coverage that any
plausible egalitarian theory would deem minimally necessary. It is as
though the government sought to combat malnutrition by requiring
all food-service establishments, from the neighborhood soup kitchen
to the Michelin three-star restaurant, to give the malnourished a fifty
percent discount on the price of every meal.
2. Invidious Discrimination
The principle invoked most persistently to justify the
prohibitionist strategy is the argument from invidious discrimination.
Discrimination on genetic grounds, it is claimed, is morally
indistinguishable from other forms of discrimination, such as racial or
gender discrimination, that are widely condemned . These latter
,- See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELs, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985) (arguing that health care
has a crucial effect on equality of opportunity)..0 See Susan M. Wolf, Beyond "Genetic Discrimination": Toward the Broader Harm of
Gn,,ticism, 23 J.L.. MED. & ETHIcs 345 (1995) (applying analysis of race and gender
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forms of discrimination are, after all, based on genetic attributes.
Therefore, proponents argue, discrimination based on genetic
attributes must also warrant moral condemnation. It is true that most
forms of invidious discrimination, such as racial or sexual
discrimination, are grounded in genetic differences. To the extent
that certain genetic characteristics-such as sickle-cell trait--are
strongly correlated with groups that have been the target of invidious
discrimination, their use as a proxy or marker for race ought equally
to be prohibited. But the link between a few genetic traits and
legitimately regulated suspect classifications hardly justifies an across-
the-board prohibition on the use of all genetic traits. It may, of
course, turn out that the genetics revolution will spawn new, as yet
unforeseen, forms of invidious discrimination. If and when this
happens, prohibitions on those forms of discrimination may be
justified. But the mere possibility that new forms of discrimination
may someday emerge cannot justify the present costs to welfare and
liberty of a blanket prohibition.
The immutability of race or sex is often identified as a basis for
the judgment that these forms of discrimination are morally offensive.
But immutability is not the touchstone for determining the
immorality of discrimination. Prohibitions against racial and gender-
based discrimination seek to remedy a very long and sorry history of
systemic subordination and oppression of readily (although
imperfectly) identifiable groups within our society. Immutability may
be important because victims of these particular forms of
discrimination cannot readily escape from the attribute that singles
them out for subordination. But the basis for moral condemnation is
not the* biological fact of immutability: it is the social fact of
oppression. There is no corresponding history of discrimination
against the "genetically disadvantaged." Indeed, there cannot be.
The science that could permit the construction of such a class is still
antidiscrimination norms to genetics).
95A frequently cited example is the use of sickle-cell screening programs to
discriminate against individuals of African descent. JAMES E. BOMAN & ROBERT F.
MRRAY, JR., GENETIC VARIATION AND DISORDERS IN PEOPLES OF AFRCA.N ORIGIN 365-
66 (1990) (detailing briefly the results of the discovery of sickle-cell trait); see also
Arthur L. Caplan, Handle with Care: Race, Class and Genetics, inJUSTICE AND THE HUMAN
GENOME PROJECT 30 (Timothy F. Murphy & Marc A. Lapp6 eds., 1994) (discussing
hypothetical situations regarding race and genetics); Patricia A. King, The Past as
Prologue: Race, Class, and Gene Discrimination, in GENE MAPPING: USING Lkw AND
ETHIcs AS GUIDES 94, 98-99 (GeorgeJ. Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992) (describing
the historical uses of sickle-cell screening).
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in its infancy.
If biology, or immutability, were the morally relevant factor, our
society would condemn the use of countless other criteria for making
differentiated judgments about people. But it does not. Consider
intelligence-a trait, or rather a congeries of cognitive information
storage and processing abilities, with undeniable genetic roots.", If
genetic discrimination were per se immoral, how could we possibly
condone the nearly universal use of intelligence measures in
education, employment, and other settings? The same could be said
for other attributes such as aggressiveness, stature, obesity, or physical
beauty.' 7
At this point in the argument, the concept of "stigmatization"
typically makes an appearance. Privacy advocates may concede that
we do not morally condemn every form of discrimination, not even
every form of discrimination based on inherited attributes. But, they
argue, we should, and in fact do, condemn discrimination based on
inherited attributes that involve social "stigma." Just as people have
historically been stigmatized for their race, it is said, so they are
stigmatized for possessing "bad" genes. An ironclad regime of genetic
privacy is thus justified to protect people from this form of undeserved
social blemish.
It is difficult to know what to make of this argument, because the
concept of stigma is so protean. Some writers seem to use the concept
of stigma in a perfectly circular fashion: a trait is stigmatizing because
it is used as a basis for differentially adverse treatment. " Others
invoke the specter of past eugenics movements, as though one can
simply abstract from the particular social conditions and stereotypes
that gave rise to those horrific abuses. Still others cite the results of
public opinion polls expressing popular concern about invasions of
genetic privacy, as though fear of misuse of information necessarily
reflected aversion to the underlying condition revealed by such
information. "
On the genetic basis for intelligence, see HAMER & COPELAND, supra note 47, at
218-19.
,1 See id. at 39-47, 73-80, 99-102, 245 (describing the genetic basis of "thrill-
seeking," depression, antisocial behavior, addiction, and obesity respectively).Se, eg., Fedder, supra note 13, at 561,565 (providing examples of stigmatization
linked uith genetics).
S- supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
See Sullivan, supra note 20, at 16 (noting that Americans tend to oppose genetic
testing if the results can be accessed by a health insurer).
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It is undeniable that disease can elicit fear and ostracism. The
most egregious contemporary example-one invoked frequently in
the genetic discrimination literature-is HIV/AIDS. But the popular
aversion to HIV-positive persons and AIDS victims has nothing to do
with genetics and very little to do with biology. It derives from an
incendiary combination of widespread phobias relating to sex,
homosexuality, licentiousness, and illicit drug use, coupled with, at
least in the early years of the AIDS epidemic, exaggerated fears of
communicability and, unfortunately, more accurate perceptions of
incurability.'1 '
By no means can one say that all genetic conditions, or even all
diseases of genetic origin, generate social stigma remotely comparable
to that visited on carriers of the AIDS virus. The most common
genetically influenced diseases, such as heart disease or cancer, elicit
reactions of sympathy and solicitude far more than fear and aversion.
Indeed, the labeling of a condition as a "disease" often reduces the
stigma attached to a condition or pattern of behavior. Consider the
characterization of alcoholism as a disease, the relabeling of "senility"
as Alzheimer's disease, or the emerging consensus that obesity has a
strong genetic component. While surely there are genetic conditions
that do produce the reactions one might fairly describe as
"stigmatization," one can hardly justify a blanket prohibition on
genetic discrimination on that ground. 102
Those who would analogize genetic discrimination to other forms
of invidious discrimination frequently invoke the example of
discrimination against persons with disabilities. After all, they argue,
if an employer is forbidden from discriminating against an applicant
or jobholder because of a manifested disabling condition, surely that
employer should also be precluded from treating adversely an
asymptomatic person who merely possesses a genetic predisposition
for that condition. The analogy is superficially attractive, but, on
closer inspection, unconvincing.
The moral justification for prohibiting disability discrimination is
comparable to that used to justify prohibitions on racial or gender
101 See Nancy Perkins, Prohibiting the Use of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Antibody
Test by Employers and Insurers, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 275, 276-78 (1988) (discussing the
history and nature of AIDS and HIV).
107 Alexander Capron argues that the stigma of "bad genes" will decline as the
"widespread and basically random nature of genetic risks becomes more apparent."
Alexander Morgan Capron, Which Ills To Bear?: Reevaluating the "Threat" of Modern
Genetics, 39 EMoRYL.J. 665, 690 (1990).
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discrimination. Our society has, due to irrational prejudice and fear,
excluded a class of persons with certain readily identifiable conditions,
fairly described as "disabilities," from activities, such as employment,
which they are otherwise qualified to perform. Thus, an employer
who excludes a person from an otherwise suitable job solely because
of her disability actively perpetuates that history of oppression and
subordination. In that sense, the employer implicates herself
sufficiently in the applicant's misfortune to become morally
responsible for its perpetuation.
It is true that the primary legal embodiment of this moral
intuition, the Americans with Disabilities Act, requires that the
employer go beyond a purely negative prohibition against using the
suspect classification as a basis for adverse treatment."3  By
affirmatively obliging employers to make "reasonable accom-
modations" for the disabled, the Act conscripts private actors to
subsidize the disadvantaged. °" But the reasonable accommodations
requirement can be viewed as a rather modest remedial measure,
much like the obligation of affirmative action in the racial context, to
effectuate an essentially prohibitory policy. As in the context of racial
discrimination, the long history of unjust discrimination against the
disabled had led to the hardening of certain exclusionary hiring
procedures, selection criteria, training routines, and job designs. The
Act obliges employers to examine those practices and, at least where
"reasonable," change them to facilitate the law's negative command.
So interpreted, the ADA does not provide a convincing precedent for
enacting a far more sweeping prohibition on the use of all genetic
factors, or even all genetic test data, in insurance and employment
decisions.
Furthermore, even to the extent that the ADA is an appropriate
template, the Act does not support a regime of absolute genetic
nondisclosure. An employer is not required to act in complete
ignorance of an applicant's or employee's disability. Although the Act
prohibits employers from inquiring about disabling conditions in
p, See supra text accompanying notes 36-42 (summarizing provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act).
p,4 It is this feature of the ADA that we find to be most morally controversial. This
may help to explain why employers have resisted ADA employment discrimination
claims so fiercely, and why courts have ruled in their favor so frequently. SeeJohn W.
Parry, Trend: Employment Decisions Under ADA Title I-Survey Update, 23 MENTAL &
PnfwsicAL DISABILITY L. REP. 294, 294 (1999) (finding that employers prevailed in
ninety-four percent of ADA employment discrimination suits in federal court that
yielded ajudicial decision favoring either party, during the period 1992-1998).
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preliminary employment screening, it explicitly authorizes employers
to administer preplacement tests and examinations that would reveal
the presence and nature of disabling conditions. In fact, the
"reasonable accommodation" strategy necessitates that employers
have such knowledge. One cannot determine whether and how to
make cost-effective accommodations to a condition without having
information, not only about the bare fact of its existence, but also the
nature and severity of its impact on functional capacities.
Indeed, one can make the case that the brute luck principle
requires disclosure of information about a person's inherited
drawbacks. Without such disclosure, persons suffering from
handicaps are in constant jeopardy of being held to unattainable
expectations. Those with whom they deal will attribute deficiencies of
performance to lack of effort or competence, rather than lack of
capacity. Of course the genetically disadvantaged person has an
incentive to disclose such limitations. But the disclosure must be full,
honest, and verifiable. For, otherwise, the opposite injustice could
occur. An individual could falsely attribute deficient performance to
an inherited incapacity, when in fact it was caused by sheer laziness,
inattentiveness, or lack of skill. Thus, the principle ofjust deserts, like
the principle of allocative efficiency, requires full disclosure of
information about congenital limitations.
There is a further objection to applying the antidiscrimination
principle to genetic differences. The paradigmatic instances of
invidious discrimination involve, in the language of Carolene Products'
famous footnote four,'05 "discrete" categories such as race or gender.
These categories are discrete in the sense that the variable defining
the classification is discontinuous.'06 It is often said that race and even
gender are social constructs, not biological realities. But, even so,
they are conventionally understood, and employed, as discontinuous
social constructs. Genetic disadvantage, "brute (bad) luck," does not
have this quality. It is a continuous, probabilistic variable. One can
have more or less bad luck. One can have more or less severe genetic
105 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
106 See Wolf, supra note 94, at 347-48 (detailing the common critiques of the
practice of comparing race and gender antidiscrimination analysis to genetic
discrimination).
107 See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1737-41
(1993) (suggesting that "whiteness" is a social construct). So, too, genetic
"abnormality" is socially constructed. See GeorgeJ. Annas, Mapping the Human Genome
and the Meaning of Monster Mythology, 39 EMoRY L.J. 629, 650 (1990) (noting that many
diseases and abnormalities are socially constructed).
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predispositions. True, the possession of a particular allele or genetic
mutation is a discontinuous variable. But, whether viewed as a
biological reality or a social construct, the possession of an allele
associated with the expression of a particular disease does not, by
itself, define the person as belonging to a discrete category. Rather, it
associates the person with a heightened probability, on a scale that
varies continuously from zero to one, of contracting that particular
disease. Risk of contracting a particular disease is, in turn, only one
aspect of a multidimensional health profile9 8
Who, then, is the object of protection in a regime that outlaws
genetic discrimination? Anyone with a genetic predisposition for a
disabling or life-threatening disease? That description encompasses
the entire human race." Only those with a probability of contracting
disabling or life-threatening diseases that exceeds a particular cutoff,
such as fifty percent? What about those with a probability of forty-
nine percent? Only those with a heightened probability of
contracting particularly severe diseases? Which diseases?
"Heightened" as compared to what baseline? Where, along the
continuously varying spectrum of genetic risk, do we separate the
privileged from the oppressed? Without a history of invidious
labeling, segregation, and oppression-the very social processes that
create Carolene Products' "discrete and insular minorities"-the
antidiscrimination principle itself furnishes no answers.
CONCLUSION
A meal consisting solely of criticism is rarely satisfying. All the
more so, perhaps, is the meal served by this essay. Even if we are
correct that the emerging genetic privacy regime is badly flawed, what
then? Are we satisfied simply to leave people, naked before the law, to
their genetic fates? The short answer to that question is an emphatic
no. Unfortunately, the long answer will be too long, in both the
formulating and the telling, for this particular occasion. We conclude
this essay with only a foretaste of the argument.
We agree with the privacy advocates that the principle of brute
J.- So Wolf, supra note 94, at 348 (criticizing the tendency to bifurcate genetics
into the realms of normal and abnormal).
101 Sce Capron, supra note 102, at 690 ("[A]Ill of us carry five to seven lethal
recessive genes as well as a still undetermined number of genes that make us
susceptible to developing diseases."); Monique K. Mansoura & Francis S. Collins,
Medical Inplications of the Genetic Revolution, I J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 329, 334
(1998) ("All of us carry an estimated five to fifty significant genetic alterations.").
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luck places a moral duty on the collectivity to provide redress for the
most egregious of genetic inequalities. Where we disagree is in the
choice of the means to this end. A morally attractive social response
to genetic inequality must have two parts: first, incentives to correct
those conditions that can be corrected, and second, subsidies to
redress the most severe conditions that cannot. Both strands of this
strategy require genetic transparency. We must know not only how
many people possess particular genotypes in order to conduct
productive research about ameliorative strategies, but we must also
know which individuals possess those genotypes in order to facilitate
and encourage corrective or preventive interventions and provide
support appropriate to their particular needs and means.
Where ignorance is an obstacle to this goal, society must adopt
policies that encourage the production and dissemination of
information, whether it be in the form of subsidies for scientific
research, encouragement of genetic counseling, or education of
insurers or employers. Where, on the other hand, lack of financial
resources is the obstacle to genetic justice, subsidies must be provided.
A subsidy can, of course, take many forms. It can be provided directly
by the government to the individual, via either a direct cash payment,
the provision of public health insurance, or a public job. Or, it can be
provided by way of the private sector, in the form of cash subsidies or
tax benefits provided to private insurers or employers who agree to
furnish insurance coverage or employment to the genetically
disadvantaged. There are good reasons for preferring some of these
methods over others. But, from the perspectives of both efficiency
and fairness, any one of these methods is preferable to conscripting
unwilling private actors to provide subsidies that are concealed-but
never fully or reliably-under a blanket of enforced ignorance.
In the final analysis, then, we are convinced that only a regime of
genetic transparency can enable our society to confront openly its
phobias about genetic diversity and begin, at last, fully to appreciate
its blessings.
